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NOTES
REMEDY
In view of the foregoing, it seems a possible and practical
solution to effectuate reapportionment by court action would be
by the following procedure. Join the officials who run the election-
secretary of state and county auditors-and ask for a declaratory
judgment that the existing statute is invalid. Then ask for an in-
junction against these officers to prohibit further elections under
that statute and for a writ of mandamus to cause an election at
large. An election at large is naturally not desirable, but it is
reasonable to assume that the legislators would reapportion rather
than face the prospect of an election at large.
CONCLUSION
If results alone are considered, the vast majority of cases would
appear to weigh against positive court action in reapportionment
suits. However, the ruling factors considered by the courts in
reaching their decisions are not, for the main part, inconsistent
with the position urged by this article.
If by sound and logical judicial reasoning, the courts can point
out innate weaknesses in a plaintiff's case, no relief will be given
or should be given. But if relief is denied only on the basis of
following old doctrines the court is failing to exert it's authority
and influence in moulding new law where new law is necessary.
The reasons for following these stodgy doctrines are unwarranted
because, as applied to reapportionment suits, they were either bad
law ab initio, or became so by passage of time and the trend of
our government to be more cognizant of civil liberties.
The basic political right of fair representation should have the
aid of the judiciary just as well as other political rights and liberties
such as speech and press. This problem must be solved, and the
courts should be the source of the remedy. Reliance on the legis-
lature for action has not been effective nor is it legally required.
VANCE HILL
FAILURE TO PROMPTLY HOLD PRELIMINARY HEARING
AS BAR TO CONVICTION
INTRODUCTION
In the interval between the arrest and preliminary hearing, the
established safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power over the
prisoner's freedom of motion ordinarily do not become effective.
Until the preliminary bearing before a magistrate, a prisoner is
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held incommunicado, without the protection that comes from the
advise of counsel or the encouragement derived from the presence
of family or friends.' During this period he is examined by the
arresting officer, who is usually attempting to procure a confession
or other evidence for the prosecution. The arresting officer is
theoretically curtailed in his examination of the prisoner by the
privilege against self-incrimination -2 and by the due process clause. 3
He is not authorized to compel the prisoner to answer his questions,
nor to interrogate for unreasonable protracted periods,4 use force, 5
or inducements, or prohibit the prisoner's consultation with an
attorney or friend.' However, when the arresting officer disregards
these privileges, by failing or refusing to produce the prisoner be-
fore the proper judicial official, the prisoner has no immediate
remedy.
A prime example of a violation of the due process clause occured
in the case of Benton v. State.7 Here, the defendant was arrested on
May 22nd and held incommunicado without the advise of counsel,
family, or friends until his hearing on June 11th. During this period,
he was threatened, coerced, and forced to sign a confession. Yet,
it was not until this constitutional right was abused, that the def-
endant was eventually released by the Supreme Court.
STATUTES
In an attempt to better safeguard our civil liberties, statutes in
most,8 if not all of the states, provide that an arresting officer is
under a duty to take the prisoner immediately, or without delay,
1. People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94, 96 (1932) (dictum).
2. U.S. Const. amend. V.
3. U.S. Const. amend. V.; amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1943).
5. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
6. Chamber v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
7. 86 Okla. 137, 190 P.2d 168 (1948).
8. Ala. Code tit. 15, §§ 160, 167 (1910); Alaska Come. Laws Ann. §§ 66-5-34, 66-5-38
(1949); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1417, 13-1418 (1956);.Ark Stat. Ann. § 43-603
(1947); Cal. Code Ann. §§ 825, 848, 849 (Wests 1954); Conn. Gen Stat. § 6-49
(1958); Del. Rev Code § 5173 (1935); D.C. Code § 4-140 (1951); Fla. Stat.
§§ 901.06, 901.23 (1953); Ga. Cod,, Ann. § 27-210, 27-212 (1953); Idaho Code §§
19-515, 19-615 (1947); Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 38 §§ 660, 664 ('Smith-Hurd 1934); Ind.
Sta'- Ann. §§ 9-432, 9-704 (Burns 1956); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 757.2, 757.7, 758.1
(1946): Kan. Gen Stat. § 62-610 (1935); La. Rev. Stat. tit. 15 §§ 79,80 (1950); Mass.
Gen Laws Ann. c. 276 § 1OB (1959); Minn Stat. Ann. §§ 629.39, 629.46 (1945);
Miss. Code Ann. § 2473 (1942); Mont. Rev Code Ann. §§ 94-5915, 94-6016 (1947);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-412 (1943); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.200 (1955); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-19-14 (1953); N.Y. Code Cim. P. §§ 158, 159, 165 (1953); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15-46 (1951); N.D. Rev Code §§ 29-0606, 29-0623, 29-0625 (1943); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2935.05 (Baldwins 1953); Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 181 (1951); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-13
(1956); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-820 (1956).
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or forthwith, or within a reasonable time, before a judicial official.9
'Various statutes provide that this official must be in some cases of
the county or district in which the arrest was made,10 or the official
issuing the warrant, l or designated in the warrant;12 or where the
arrest is made without a warrant he must be the most accessible
judicial official having jurisdiction. 3 At this time the prisoner is to
be examined and held or released as the case requires.
This examination of the prisoner is the preliminary examination
or preliminary hearing, the two terms being synonymous. 4 It is
not a trial, but the commencement of criminal prosecution," before
a regularly constituted court, or judicial magistrate, in which the
accused has the right to be present to hear all the witnesses, partici-
pate in their examination and be heard in his own behalf."6 The
object of the preliminary hearing is to inquire touching the com-
mission of the crime and the acused's connection with it, and to
perpetuate testimony. 17 It is, in essence, an inquiry to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to hold the accised for trial. 18
Since there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, 19
such right is vested in the accused as well as in the state by stat-
ute.20 Yet because of the lack of a constitutional right concerning
preliminary hearing, the person accused has no constitutional right
to representation by an attorney 2' and such right must be provided
by statute as in New York. 22 However even where counsel is pro-
vided by statute, the accused may waive it merely by failure to
assert same.23
If the preliminary hearing is waived, or the court or magistrate,
finds that there is sufficient ground to hold the accused, he will be
held to answer an indictment 24 or information.2' This procedure
of answering or pleading is called arraignment. It consists of calling
9. United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (immediately); Mullins
v. Sanders, 18.9 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116 (1949) (reasonable time); Winston v. Com-
monwealth, 188 Va. 386; 49 S.E.2d 611 (1948) (forthwith); Trinity Hospital Ass'n v.
Minot, 76 N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1956) (dictum).
10. Tierney v. State, 178 Misc. 421, 34 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1942).
11. Chitwood v. Eyman, 74 Ariz. 334, 248 P.2d 884 (1952).
12. See Shepherd v. City of Richmond, 306 Ky. 595. 208 S.W.2d 744 (1948).
13. Haverbekken v. Holingsworth, 250 S.W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App. .1923).
14 State v. Rogers, 31 N.M. 485, 247 Pac. 828, 833 (1926) (dictum).
15. State v. Wismewski, 13 N.D. 649, 651, 102 N.W. 883 (1905) (dictum).
16. In re Dolph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 Pac. 470, 471 (1891) (dictum).
17. State v. ex rel Guion Atty. Gen. v. Brunot, '104 La. 237, 28 So. 996 (1900).
18. State v. Jeffery, 211 Minn. 55, 300 N.W. 7 (1941).
19. Burall v. Johnston, 53 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
20 See-note 17 supra.
21. State v. Sullivan, 227 F.2d 511 (10th. Cir. 1956).
22. N.Y. Code Crim. P. § 188 (1953).
23. People v. Reedy, 6 Miso,2d 963, 164 N.Y.S.2d 65, (1957).
24. State v. Goudy, 94 W.Va. 542, 119 S.E. 685 (1923).
25. State v. Rogers, supra note 14 at 834 (dictum).
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the accused to the bar of the court, at which time the information
must be read or explained to him, and he must be asked whether
he pleads guilty or not guilty to the information or indictment. Its
only purpose being to obtain from him, his answer or plea there-
to.26 At least. one state requires in addition to the above, that the
defendant must be given a copy of the indictment or information.2 7
At this time the magistrate inquires into the cause of the prisoner's
detention, sets reasonable bail if the crime is bailable, and advises
the defendant of his right of counsel. Hence, in some cases, where
there is no preliminary hearing, it is not until the arraignment,
while in others it is at the preliminary hearing that the require-
ments of due process become operative.
Both preliminary hearing and arraignment have always been
jealously guarded rights of an accused;2" statutes in nearly all of
the states 29 and federal jurisdictions provide for the commitment
of the accused promptly3 ° The purpose of these statutes is two-
fold: (1) to abolish unlawful detention, 3' (2) to check secret in-
terrogation of the accused through the use of unauthorized
methods.2 2
ABOLISHMENT OF UNLAWFUL DETENTION
Courts, especially anxious to preserve human liberties via the
abolishment of unlawful detention, interpret commitment statutes
strictly. Where a statute requires the accused to be committed
within a reasonable time not to exceed 48 hours excluding holidays,
a California court has held that any detention beyond the pre-
scribed period requires reversal of conviction2 3 Yet where no
definite time within which to commit the accused is provided by
statute, courts have held that the issues of (1) whether the arrest-
ing officer is compelled to immediately take the prisoner before
the proper official to give bond, (2) whether the period of de-
tention of the prisoner before taking him before a magistrate or
releasing him on bail is reasonable, depend on the circumstances
of each case.2 4 Here, the issues are ordinarily questions of fact
26. Yodock v. United States, 97 F.Supp. 307, 310 (D. Pa. 1951) (dictum); Howard
v. State, 165 Ala. 18, 50 So. 954, 958 (1909) (dictum).
27. State v. DeWolfe, 29 Mont. 415, 74 Pac. 1084, 1085 (1904) (dictum).
28. See Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625 (1896).
29. See note 8 supra.
30 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 (a), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-3 (1943)
(dictum).
31. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
32. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
33. People v. Speaks, 156 Cal. App. 2d 25, 319 P.2d 709 (1958).
34. Harbison v. Chicago, Rock Island R.R. & P., 32 Mo 440, 37 S.W.2d 609 (1931)
(arrest with warrant). Peloquin v. Hibner, 231 Wis. 77, 285 N.W. 380 (1939) (arrest
without warrant coupled with consent of accused to remain in custody).
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tested by the rule of reason before a jury, unless the facts are un-
disputed.15 Where it is found that unnecessary delay did in fact
exist, some courts hold that such constitutes a violation of statutory
rights and a deprivation of liberty without due process, requiring
reversal of conviction,3" while others have granted a new trial.3 7
Moreover, these courts requiring strict compliance with the com-
mitment statutes, also hold that officers who unlawfully detain one
suspected of a crime, without taking the suspect before a magistrate
as provided by statute, are guilty of a misdemeanor.38 Such officers
are also held civilly liable for false imprisonment or false arrest.8 9
Some courts have held otherwise based on the following reasons:
(1) unnecessary delay to commit the accused in itself does not
violate due process of law which only requires that the accused
has sufficient notice of the accusation and an adequate opportunity
to defend himself,4o (2) the accused has a civil remedy by bring-
ing an action for false imprisonment or false arrest.4' These courts
hold that when an officer fails to perform his statutory duty to
forthwith bring the accused before the proper authority, even
though no opportunity for bail is afforded the defendant, he is not
denied a fair trial; hence, it is not necessarily a ground for reversal
of conviction. 42 However, in recognizing the possible unjust con-
sequences which an unnecessary delay in the accused's commit-
ment may incur, a few courts in the light of their state constitution
qualify this rule. They hold that where the effect of the failure of
the officer to commit the defendant is such as to deprive him of the
constitutional right to call evidence in his favor, his subsequent
conviction lacks the required due process of law, and cannot
stand. Some jurisdictions hold that statutes requiring that the
defendant shall forthwith be carried before the most convenient
magistrate are directory and not mandatory.44 They prescribe to
the general rule that the accused should be committed without
35. Mullins v. Sanders, 189 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116 (1949).
36. Benton v. State, 68 Okla. 137, 190 P.2d 168 (1948) (Oklahoma Constitution so
provides).
37. People v. Crabb, 372 111. 347, 24 N.E.2d 46 (1939).
38. People v. Kelly, 264 App. Div. 14, 35 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1942) (provided by statute).
39. Kaufman v. Brown, 93 Cal.App. 2d 508, 209 P.2d 156 (1949); See Norton v.
Mathers, 222 Iowa 1170, 271 N.W. 321 (1937).
40. Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914).
41. See note 39 supra.
42. People v. MeCrasky, 149 Cal.App. 2d 630, 309 P.2d 115 (1957) (no confession);
McHone v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 435, 57 S.E.2d 109 (1950) (drunkenness).
43. Winston v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 386, 49 S.E.2d 611 (1948) (Va. Const. § 8
provides calling for evidence is right of accused).
44. Moore v. State, 315 S.W.2d 907 (Ark. 1958); See Winston v. Commonwealth, supra
note 43.
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unnecessary delay unless a paramount interest of the state is in-
volved or perhaps where an innocent citizen may suffer.
CHECK SECRET INTERROGATION
In an attempt to safeguard against the dangers of overzealous
law enforcement practices during the interval between the arrest
and commitment, federal courts have provided a procedural check
on the misconduct of officers which is designed to protect persons
from police third degree methods." This is based on the theory
that commitment statutes were designed so that the accused may
be advised of his rights, and so that the issue of probable cause
might be promptly determined. Hence, if the courts exclude
evidence procured during illegal detention, the action of police
officers will not defeat this purpose by subjecting the accused to
interrogation to determine whether he shall be charged, and there-
after convicted out of his own mouth.4 ' Thus in McNabb v. United
States, it was held that a confession is inadmissible if made during
illegal detention due to failure to promptly carry a prisoner before
a committing magistrate.4 7 However in Mitchell v. United States,
the rule was slightly narrowed as a means of restraining unauthor-
ized police practices when the court held that a voluntary con-
fession made immediately after arrest is admissible even though
followed by an unlawful period of detention.48
The view that the mere failure to commit the prisoner promptly
renders his detention illegal, and the confession procured during
this period inadmissible as evidence ignores the psychological
truth that every guilty person is almost always ready and willing
to confess as soon as he is detected.49 Protection of the individual
is achieved at the expense of the public welfare, i. e., the efficiency
of law enforcement officers is seriously curtailed. Some state courts
sustaining this view, hold that failure of an officer to comply with
the commitment statutes does not render the confession involuntary
or inadmissible, as such.5° In the case of Stroble v. California,1 "the
court held that the illegal conduct of state law enforcement officers
in not taking the defendant promptly before a committing magis-
trate was not shown to have coerced the confession of the defend-
ant and in no way deprive him of a fair or impartial trial. Thus the
45. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
46. Watson v. United States, 249 F.2d 106 (1957).
47. See note 45 supra.
48. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
49. 3 See Wigmore Evidence § 851 (1940).
50. Ingram v. State, 34 Ala. App. 597, 42 So.2d 30 (1949).
51. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
[VOL. 36
court expressed the view that delay in committing the accused,
during which time a confession was procured, does not deny due
process, requiring exclusion of the evidence as punishment for un-
authorized police practices.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the trend toward relaxation of the technicalities of
committing an accused, the civil liberties which we all hold dear,
can best be protected against unauthorized police practices by
strict compliance with statutes providing for prompt commitment.
For it is in this interval prior to the commitment of the accused
that the desire to procure evidence is great, hence law enforcement
officers resort to illegal detention and third degree methods.
At first glance it appears that the protection of the individual
is achieved at the expense of the public if illegal detention is to be
abolished by reversal of a subsequent conviction or dismissal. Yet
it must be recognized that the innocent layman suffers much more
than the hardened criminal during this period prior to his com-
mitment before a magistrate. For it is common knowledge that The
hardened criminal usually has designated certain times when he
will call or "check in" with his attorney. Hence, when he fails to
call his attorney at the prescribed hour, the attorney assumes him
to be arrested and immediately by pre-arranged agreement pro-
ceeds to find him. Here illegal detention is without purpose, for
the hardened criminal has taken an additional precaution which
the non-criminal hasn't provided. Consequently to relax the techni-
calities in regard to the commitment of an accused before a
magistrate would be sheer folly. For the non-criminal, rather than
the criminal, suffers by such a practice.
Perhaps the better and more direct remedy is not only to dismiss
or reverse a subsequent conviction, but also to provide by statute
that willful illegal detention is a crime for which the violator is to
be fined or suspended from service or imprisoned. Thus the pro-
tection of the individual non-criminal who represents the public
can be achieved on an equal basis with that afforded known
violators through their "home made" safeguard.
Another reason for strengthening the technicalities involved in
committing the accused is to promote a fair and impartial trial.
Here it must be remembered that during the period of illegal
detention the prosecution is preparing its case while the accused,
who is usually held incommunicado, is without opportunity to pre-
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pare for his defense. When the accused is finally committed and
arraigned, he is wholly unprepared. He may be prejudiced by the
delay, in that evidence or proof of his innocence which was
formerly available may now have vanished. Thus where the effect
of a violation of this formality may be such as to deprive the
accused of a constitutional right having a direct bearing upon a
fair and impartial trial, such detention certainly should be con-
sidered a bar to conviction.
On the other hand, the only weapon against third degree
methods or unjust police practices, is the judicial policy of ex-
cluding evidence obtained during and as a result of a delay in
commitment. For where the accused is confronted by a confession,
procured as a result of the delay, it would be unfair to convict
him, even if the violator of the statute is punished for his un-
authorized acts. To hold otherwise would not only induce third
degree methods, but also deny the accused the fair and impartial
trial to which he is entitled.
Since the effect of either illegal detention or third degree
methods is such as to prejudice the trial of the accused, either by
denying him his constitutional right to defend himself or by sub-
jecting the non-criminal to the practices which the hardened
criminal is safeguarded against, or by introducing evidence obtained
through protracted questioning, statutes providing for prompt
commitment should be strictly construed and perhaps even streng-
thened. The failure to commit the accused promptly should be held
a bar to conviction.
ROBERT V. BRASETH
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